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Short answer. Arizona lets two or more firms jointly working on a matter divide a fee paid by a client only if the firms disclose to the client in writing how the fee will be divided and how the firms will divide responsibility for the matter among themselves; the client consents to the division of fees in a writing signed by the client; the total fee is reasonable; and the division of responsibility among firms is reasonable in light of the client’s need that the entire representation be completely and diligently completed (ER 1.5(e), in force since January 1, 2021). Today’s rule has no proportion-or-joint-responsibility condition, and it states no percentage limit on either firm’s share. No authority we hold applies today’s words.

Sources read October 3, 2026; checked against LegalFlare’s research October 28, 2026. Rules text for ERs 1.5, 7.3 and 8.5 is as printed on the State Bar of Arizona’s Rules of Professional Conduct pages, fetched October 3, 2026. ER 7.2 as reserved, and the former words of ERs 5.4 and 7.2, are from Arizona Supreme Court Orders R-20-0030 and R-20-0034 on azcourts.gov, fetched October 3, 2026. A.R.S. 12-3453(A) is from Laws 2025, chapter 226, § 1 on azleg.gov, fetched October 3, 2026. This page is general information, not legal advice. See the disclaimer.

Arizona’s referral fee rules at a glance

Question Arizona’s answer Source
Governing rule ER 1.5(e), Arizona’s Rules of Professional Conduct, as printed by the State Bar of Arizona State Bar of Arizona, ER 1.5(e)
Written client consent Required in every division: the client consents to the division of fees in a writing signed by the client ER 1.5(e)(2)
Notice to the client The firms disclose to the client in writing how the fee will be divided and how the firms will divide responsibility for the matter among themselves ER 1.5(e)(1)
Proportion to services or joint responsibility Not a condition of today’s rule; the division of responsibility among firms must be reasonable in light of the client’s need that the entire representation be completely and diligently completed ER 1.5(e)(4)
Reasonable total fee Required ER 1.5(e)(3)
Cap on the secondary lawyer’s share None stated in ER 1.5(e) ER 1.5(e)
Statutes Our statute search found none on dividing fees between lawyers. A.R.S. 12-3453(A), on a litigation financier’s paying for referrals to it, is quoted under “Paying for referrals, and nonlawyers” below Laws 2025, ch. 226, § 1

What ER 1.5(e) says

ER 1.5(e) of Arizona’s Rules of Professional Conduct governs the division of a fee between firms. Its words, in force since January 1, 2021 (State Bar of Arizona, ER 1.5(e)):

(e) Two or more firms jointly working on a matter may divide a fee paid by a client if:

(1) the firms disclose to the client in writing how the fee will be divided and how the firms will divide responsibility for the matter among themselves;

(2) the client consents to the division of fees in a writing signed by the client;

(3) the total fee is reasonable; and

(4) the division of responsibility among firms is reasonable in light of the client’s need that the entire representation be completely and diligently completed.

No authority in our research applies these words. Every Arizona decision and opinion on this page that construes ER 1.5(e) applied an earlier wording, which our research holds only as those authorities quote it (and, for the 2016 wording, as a stored former version not used on this page). As they quote it: before December 1, 2003, lawyers could divide fees in proportion to the services performed without joint responsibility or the client’s written agreement (Opinion 04-02); from December 1, 2003, each lawyer receiving any portion of the fee had to assume joint responsibility for the representation, and the client had to agree, in a writing signed by the client, to the participation of all the lawyers involved (Opinions 04-02, 05-02, 10-04); and from 2016 the division had to be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer receiving any portion of the fee had to assume joint responsibility, and the client had to agree in a signed writing to the participation of all the lawyers involved and the division of the fees and responsibilities between the lawyers (Opinion 16-01). The last of those wordings ended on January 1, 2021. None of them is today’s rule.

What the client must agree to in writing

Every division needs the client’s consent to the division of fees in a writing signed by the client (ER 1.5(e)(2)), and the firms must disclose to the client in writing how the fee will be divided and how the firms will divide responsibility for the matter among themselves (ER 1.5(e)(1)). These words are in force from January 1, 2021; no authority in our research applies them.

Before 2021 the client term, as the authorities quote it, was that the client agree, in a writing signed by the client, to the participation of all the lawyers involved (the wording from December 1, 2003: Opinions 04-02, 05-02 and 10-04; ER 1.5(e)(2) as it stood in 2015 in Levine), and from 2016 also to the division of the fees and responsibilities between the lawyers (Opinion 16-01; Levine n.4).

In Levine v. Haralson, Miller, Pitt, Feldman & McAnally, P.L.C. (2018), the Arizona Court of Appeals held that ER 1.5(c) (a contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client) and ER 1.5(e)(2) as it stood in 2015 prohibit oral contingent fee and fee-splitting agreements, that the lawyer’s asserted oral agreements were void as against public policy, and that he could not recover in quantum meruit. It applied the 2015 wording of (e)(2), not today’s. State Bar of Arizona Opinion 10-04 (2010, advisory), on the 2003 wording, advised that a fee may not be divided with a referring out-of-state lawyer whom the client’s contingent fee agreement does not include and who does nothing further, for want of the client’s written consent and joint responsibility.

What must be disclosed to the client

Today’s disclosure term is that the firms disclose to the client in writing how the fee will be divided and how the firms will divide responsibility for the matter among themselves (ER 1.5(e)(1)); the client’s signed writing is consent to the division of fees (ER 1.5(e)(2)). No authority in our research construes these words.

Under the 2003 wording (the client’s signed agreement to the participation of all the lawyers involved), State Bar of Arizona Opinion 04-02 (2004, advisory) advised that the client must be informed of the respective role of each lawyer in the representation, and any limits on it, and agree in writing to their participation, but need not agree to the particular share each lawyer is to receive. That conclusion was reached under words that did not mention the division of the fee. It predates both the 2016 wording (written agreement to the division of the fees and responsibilities, as Opinion 16-01 quotes it) and today’s written disclosure of how the fee will be divided, and it is not a statement of today’s rule. Opinion 10-04 (2010, advisory, on the 2003 wording) added, for an out-of-state lawyer, that the client must acknowledge that lawyer is not admitted in Arizona and consent to that lawyer’s representation (citing ER 5.5(e)).

Proportionality or joint responsibility

Today’s rule has no proportion-or-joint-responsibility condition. Two or more firms jointly working on a matter may divide a fee paid by a client only if all four conditions hold: the firms disclose to the client in writing how the fee will be divided and how the firms will divide responsibility for the matter among themselves ((e)(1)); the client consents to the division of fees in a writing signed by the client ((e)(2)); the total fee is reasonable ((e)(3)); and the division of responsibility among firms is reasonable in light of the client’s need that the entire representation be completely and diligently completed ((e)(4)). These words are in force from January 1, 2021; no authority in our research applies them.

The earlier wordings, as the authorities quote them, did carry such a condition. Before December 1, 2003, lawyers could divide fees in proportion to the services performed without joint responsibility or the client’s written agreement (Opinion 04-02). From December 1, 2003, each lawyer receiving any portion of the fee had to assume joint responsibility for the representation (Opinions 04-02, 05-02, 10-04). By 2016 the division had to be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer, or each lawyer receiving any portion of the fee had to assume joint responsibility (Opinion 16-01). None of these is today’s rule.

Under the 2003 wording, Opinion 04-02 (2004, advisory) advised that Arizona did not allow a lawyer to be paid a referral or finder’s fee merely for referring a case where the referring lawyer has no further involvement, but that a referring lawyer may share a single fee if ER 1.5(e) is met; that joint responsibility exists if the referring lawyer assumes financial responsibility for any malpractice that occurs during the representation; and that the referring lawyer may, but need not, also have supervisory or other substantive involvement. Opinion 10-04 (2010, advisory) followed it that fee division does not require substantive involvement, and advised that a lawyer admitted in another U.S. jurisdiction is a lawyer with whom a fee may be divided if ER 1.5(e) and ER 5.5 are met. Opinion 16-01 (2016, advisory, on the 2016 wording) advised that a lawyer in a true “of counsel” relationship is a member of the same firm, so ER 1.5(e) does not govern dividing fees with that lawyer. Levine (2018, on the 2015 wording) held an oral fee-division agreement void as against public policy, barring quantum meruit. These are the authorities’ readings of the wordings they applied, not of today’s ER 1.5(e).

Referring a case out of Arizona, or into it

Arizona’s choice-of-law rule, ER 8.5(b), says which jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct apply when Arizona exercises its disciplinary authority (State Bar of Arizona, ER 8.5(b)). Our research holds no effective date for these words, so this page gives none:

(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the rules of professional conduct to be applied shall be as follows:

(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and

(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur.

Dividing a fee with an out-of-state lawyer. State Bar of Arizona Opinion 10-04 (2010, advisory), applying the ER 1.5(e) wording in force from December 1, 2003, not today’s, advised that “lawyer” in ER 1.5(e) includes a lawyer admitted in another U.S. jurisdiction, so an Arizona lawyer may divide a fee with a referring out-of-state lawyer if the arrangement meets ER 1.5(e) and the out-of-state lawyer’s services comply with ER 5.5 and the pro hac vice rules; the client must also acknowledge that the out-of-state lawyer is not admitted in Arizona and consent to that lawyer’s representation. It decided the question under ERs 1.5(e) and 5.5, not ER 8.5(b).

Our searches (October 3–4, 2026) found no Arizona statute, court decision or ethics opinion applying ER 8.5(b); this page does not say none exists. No authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral or fee division.

Paying for referrals, and nonlawyers

  • ER 7.2 and ER 5.4 today. ER 7.2 reads “[Reserved]” from January 1, 2021 (Order R-20-0030), and ER 5.4 was abrogated effective January 1, 2021 (Order R-20-0034). No words of either rule are in force in our research. The same order adopted Rule 31.1(c), under which an alternative business structure that includes nonlawyers may employ lawyers to provide legal services only if, among other conditions, it is licensed under ACJA § 7-209, and Rule 33.1 on the committee that regulates those entities; the requirements of those rules are not in the research this page is drawn from. This page does not state what Arizona now requires for sharing fees with nonlawyers or paying for recommendations beyond Ethics Opinion EO-20-0003 and the words quoted here.
  • Former ER 7.2(b), which ended on January 1, 2021. “(b) A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services except that a lawyer may:” pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by the Rule ((b)(1)); pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a not-for-profit or qualified lawyer referral service, which could include, in addition to any membership fee, a fee calculated as a percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer to whom the service or organization referred a matter, provided that any such percentage fee did not exceed ten percent and was used only to help defray the reasonable operating expenses of the service or organization and to fund public service activities, including the delivery of pro bono legal services, the fees paid by a client referred by such service not to exceed the total charges the client would have paid had no such service been involved, a qualified lawyer referral service being one approved by an appropriate regulatory authority ((b)(2)); and pay for a law practice in accordance with ER 1.17 ((b)(3)). The ten percent figure is that former rule’s; it ended on January 1, 2021 and is not a current cap. Former Comment [3] allowed paying others for generating client leads as long as the lead generator was consistent with ERs 1.5(e) and 5.4 and its communications with ER 7.1, but not paying a lead generator that states, implies, or creates a reasonable impression that it is recommending the lawyer, is making the referral without payment from the lawyer, or has analyzed a person’s legal problems when determining which lawyer should receive the referral; a de minimis gift that is not a quid pro quo for referring a particular client was permissible. Under former Comment [5], a communication contained a recommendation if it endorsed or vouched for a lawyer’s credentials, abilities, competence, character, or other professional qualities, and directory listings, group advertisements, and online referral services that list lawyers by practice area were not impermissible recommendations.
  • Former ER 5.4, which ended on January 1, 2021. “(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:” an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm, partner, or associate could provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons ((a)(1)); a lawyer who purchased the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer could, under ER 1.17, pay the agreed-upon purchase price to that lawyer’s estate or other representative ((a)(2)); a lawyer or law firm could include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even one based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement ((a)(3)); and a lawyer could share court-awarded legal fees or fees otherwise received and permissible under the rules with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter ((a)(4)). Former ER 5.4(c) barred a lawyer from permitting a person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such legal services.
  • Opinions and decisions under the former rules. Under former ERs 5.4 and 7.2, the State Bar opinions here (all advisory) advised that a referral fee that does not satisfy ER 1.5(e) violates ER 7.2(b) (04-02, on the 2003 wording of ER 1.5(e)); that a lawyer may not pay a for-profit lawyer referral service not approved by an appropriate regulatory authority (05-08, 06-06); that a group advertising program that discloses its advertising nature and endorses no lawyer is not a referral service, and pay-per-click charges not based on fees the lawyer receives are a reasonable cost of advertisements (11-02); that a lawyer may not pay even a not-for-profit referral service a percentage of the fees earned on every referred case (10-01, under a 2010 wording without the percentage-fee words above); and that fee sharing with nonlawyers was likely where a voucher marketer collects and keeps part of a consumer’s prepayment for legal services (13-01), but not where a staffing agency’s charge for a temporary lawyer is not calculated from what the client pays (00-10). The Arizona Supreme Court held in Struthers (1994) that an agreement to turn over all of a lawyer’s fees to a nonlawyer-run company violated ER 5.4. Whether this pre-2021 analysis carries over after the January 1, 2021 abrogation and reservation is not decided by any authority we hold. This page does not present it as today’s law, and does not say it has been displaced.
  • After the abrogation. Ethics Opinion EO-20-0003, of the Arizona Supreme Court’s Attorney Ethics Advisory Committee, advised on its fee-financing facts that an arrangement in which a nonlawyer lender keeps 25% of the lawyer’s fees is no longer subject to Former ER 5.4 and is permissible, provided it does not run afoul of any other Rule of Professional Conduct. It speaks only to those facts.
  • Solicitation. ER 7.3, in force since January 1, 2021 (State Bar of Arizona, ER 7.3), defines “solicitation” as a communication initiated by or on behalf of a lawyer or firm that is directed to a specific person the lawyer knows or reasonably should know needs legal services in a particular matter and that offers to provide, or reasonably can be understood as offering to provide, legal services for that matter ((a)). “(b) A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by live person-to-person contact when a significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s or firm’s pecuniary gain, unless the contact is with a:” lawyer; person who has a family, close personal, or prior business or professional relationship with the lawyer or firm; or person who routinely uses for business purposes the type of legal services offered by the lawyer ((b)(1)–(3)). A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment or knowingly permit solicitation on the lawyer’s behalf, even when not otherwise prohibited by paragraph (b), if the target of the solicitation has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer, or the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment ((c)(1)–(2)). The Rule does not prohibit communications authorized by law or ordered by a court or other tribunal ((d)). Our search found no Arizona court decision applying former ER 7.2(b) or ER 7.3.
  • Statute. A.R.S. 12-3453(A), in force since January 1, 2026, is held in our research only as enacted by Laws 2025, chapter 226, § 1 (azleg.gov). In the session law’s words, which keep its capitals:

a. A litigation financier may not Pay or offer to pay a commission, referral fee or other consideration to legal counsel, a law firm or a licensed health care provider, for referring a person to the litigation financier without disclosing in writing to the potential borrower. The disclosure must be made before entering into the litigation financing agreement and must be SEPARATELY acknowledged and agreed to by the potential borrower, including the amount of the commission, referral fee or other consideration to be paid for the referral on behalf of the borrower.

Its words speak to a litigation financier. It is not part of ER 7.2, and it does not replace it. This page states no penalty, definition or other subsection of the statute.

Arizona cases

We state what each decision held, in the words of our research. Later treatment of these decisions has not been searched, so do not read this list as a statement that each one remains good law. Each applied a wording in force before 2021, as its entry notes.

Case Citation Year What it held
In the Matter of Gottesman 172 Ariz. 121; 834 P.2d 1266; 1992 Ariz. LEXIS 57 1992 Supreme Court of Arizona, in reciprocal discipline, censured a New Jersey lawyer who was also a member of the State Bar of Arizona, after the Supreme Court of New Jersey had publicly reprimanded him for an arrangement in which an investigator who obtained personal-injury clients received a share (agreed at 50%, in practice one-third) of the resulting fees. The Disciplinary Commission’s report, attached to the order, found that his conduct would constitute a violation of Arizona ER 5.4(a) and ER 5.5, so identical discipline would not be a grave injustice or warrant substantially different discipline under Rule 58(c). That ER 5.4(a) statement is the Commission’s, made to decide reciprocal discipline, without analysis of the rule. It applied the ER 5.4(a) in force in 1992.
Matter of Struthers 877 P.2d 789; 179 Ariz. 216; 169 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 4; 1994 Ariz. LEXIS 74 1994 Supreme Court of Arizona disbarred a lawyer on 143 violations. On ER 5.4: his agreement with a company run by nonlawyers required him to turn over all fees he received, any profit after expenses to be distributed by agreement; the Court held the Disciplinary Commission correct that the agreement violated ER 5.4, and that routing the fees through his operating account before conveying them in bulk to a nonlawyer would not have kept it from being fee splitting. Paying a creditor’s bill for specific services rendered is proper; agreeing to transfer all of the lawyer’s fees to a nonlawyer and split what remains after costs is not. It applied the ER 5.4(a) in force for 1989–1991 conduct.
In the Matter of Phillips 244 P.3d 549 2010 Supreme Court of Arizona, in a discipline for failure to supervise, accepted findings that the managing lawyer of a high-volume firm violated ERs 5.1(a) and 5.3(a) and reduced his suspension to six months. As a term of the sanction it ordered that during the suspension he is not entitled to receive any income generated by the firm, citing in a footnote ER 5.4(a) (“A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer.”) and other states’ authorities treating a suspended lawyer as a nonlawyer. That is a footnoted citation supporting a sanction term, not a holding construing ER 5.4(a). It applied the pre-2021 ER 5.4(a).
Levine v. Haralson, Miller, Pitt, Feldman & McAnally, P.L.C. 418 P.3d 1007 2018 Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a lawyer’s quantum meruit claim against the firm that settled his former clients’ personal-injury case, where he had no written contingent fee agreement with the clients and no written agreement with the referring lawyer to divide fees. It held that ER 1.5(c) (a contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client) and ER 1.5(e)(2) as it stood in 2015 (a division of a fee between lawyers not in the same firm only if the client agrees, in a writing signed by the client, to the participation of all the lawyers involved) prohibit oral contingent fee and fee-splitting agreements; that the rules have the force of statutes and establish public policy, so his asserted oral agreements were void as against public policy; and that quantum meruit was therefore unavailable. It applied the 2015 wording of (e)(2), noting (n.4) the 2016 amendment; it did not apply the 2021 wording.

Arizona ethics opinions

The State Bar of Arizona Committee on the Rules of Professional Conduct opinions each state that they are advisory in nature only and not binding in any disciplinary or other legal proceedings. EO-20-0003 is an opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court’s Attorney Ethics Advisory Committee; this page does not present it as binding. The State Bar opinions are dated here by their copyright year only; Opinion 05-02 and EO-20-0003 carry no issue date in our research and are not dated. Every opinion here except EO-20-0003 applied a wording in force before 2021, as its entry notes, and none applies today’s ER 1.5(e). As with the cases, later treatment of these opinions has not been searched.

Opinion Year What it said
Opinion 00-10 2000 A staffing agency that places temporary lawyers with law firms does not share legal fees with nonlawyers in violation of ER 5.4, because what the firm pays the agency is not a legal fee paid by a client. A firm may pay the temporary lawyer and separately pay the agency a fixed amount or a percentage of the lawyer’s compensation, or pay the agency a total that the agency splits with the lawyer, provided the payment is made regardless of amounts received from the firm’s client and is not calculated as a percentage of what the firm receives from the client. It applied the ER 5.4(a) of 2000.
Opinion 02-08 2002 Sponsoring a firm booth at a business exposition is not in itself a prohibited in-person solicitation. Lawyers at a booth must not approach, accost or importune the public or use deceptive tactics, must leave the decision to make contact to the public, and must avoid gatherings where vulnerable people reasonably can be expected. It applied the pre-2003 ER 7.3(a), a prohibition on in-person and telephone solicitation, not today’s ER 7.3.
Opinion 04-02 2004 Under the ER 1.5(e) wording in force from December 1, 2003: a lawyer may not be paid a referral or finder’s fee merely for referring a case where the referring lawyer has no further involvement, but a referring lawyer may share a single fee if ER 1.5(e) is met (each lawyer receiving any portion of the fee assumes joint responsibility, the client agrees in a signed writing to the participation of all the lawyers involved, and the total fee is reasonable). Joint responsibility exists if the referring lawyer assumes financial responsibility for any malpractice that occurs during the representation; supervisory or other substantive involvement is permitted but not required. The client must be informed of each lawyer’s role and any limits on it, but need not agree to the particular share each lawyer is to receive. A referral fee that does not satisfy ER 1.5(e) violates ER 7.2(b); a de minimis gift that is not a quid pro quo for a referral does not. It applied the 2003 wording of ER 1.5(e) and the pre-2021 ER 7.2(b), not the 2016 wording nor today’s ER 1.5(e), whose terms differ.
Opinion 05-02 Not dated An inactive member of the State Bar remains subject to the Ethical Rules. An inactive lawyer operating an MVD-certified traffic school may pay a $10 referral fee to a non-lawyer who refers a student, because the fee is not related to legal services, but may not pay it to a lawyer for the referral of a client: offered in advance it is a quid pro quo referral fee, a lawyer’s acceptance of it, even at $10, is impermissible, and offering it would knowingly assist or induce a violation under ER 8.4(a). It recites ERs 1.5(e), 5.4(a) and 7.2(b) as background and does not decide the question under any one of them. It applied the pre-2021 wordings.
Opinion 05-08 2005 A lawyer may not pay a for-profit online service that both functions as a lawyer referral service (it receives requests for lawyer services and allocates them to particular lawyers) and holds itself out as one; under ER 7.2(b)(2), if the entity is a for-profit referral service not approved by the bar, payment in any form is proscribed, whether or not it is linked to each referral. It applied the wordings of ER 7.2(b)(2) and its comment [6] in force from December 1, 2003, and the 2003 ER 7.3, not today’s ER 7.3. Opinion 06-06 (n.2) says 05-08 is no longer effective to the extent inconsistent with 06-06, without withdrawing it.
Opinion 06-06 2006 An Arizona lawyer cannot participate in a for-profit online matching service not approved by an appropriate regulatory authority, because it is a lawyer referral service within the meaning of ER 7.2(b): it allocates prospective clients to particular lawyers it represents as qualified and holds itself out as finding the “right” lawyer, and its “verified” lawyers, satisfaction guarantee, priority service and membership limited by practice and geographic area show referral, not a directory listing; that the client chooses among several lawyers does not change that. It applied the pre-2021 ER 7.2(b)(2) and comment [6] as worded in 2006, and superseded 05-08 to the extent inconsistent (n.2).
Opinion 10-01 2010 A lawyer may not ethically participate in a not-for-profit lawyer referral service that, as a condition of participation, requires the lawyer to pay it a percentage of the fees earned on referred cases. The exceptions to ER 5.4(a), whose purpose is to protect the lawyer’s professional independence of judgment, are construed narrowly; (a)(4), as it then read, allowed sharing only court-awarded legal fees with a nonprofit that employed, retained or recommended the lawyer. ER 7.2(b)(2)’s “usual charges” cannot be construed to include a percentage of the fees earned. It applied the 2010 wordings, which lack the later former words “or fees otherwise received and permissible under these rules” in (a)(4) and the percentage-fee words in 7.2(b)(2); it did not construe those later words.
Opinion 10-04 2010 “Lawyer” in ER 1.5(e) includes a lawyer admitted in another U.S. jurisdiction, so an Arizona lawyer may divide a fee with a referring out-of-state lawyer if the arrangement meets ER 1.5(e) and the out-of-state lawyer’s services comply with ER 5.5 and the pro hac vice rules. A fee may not be divided with a referring lawyer who is not included in the contingent fee agreement and does nothing further; it may be where the client consents in writing to the division, both lawyers assume joint responsibility and the overall fee is reasonable, substantive involvement not being required (citing 04-02), and the client must also acknowledge that the out-of-state lawyer is not admitted in Arizona and consent to that lawyer’s representation. A separate fee agreement directly between the out-of-state lawyer and the client is not fee division under ER 1.5(e). It applied the ER 1.5(e) wording in force from December 1, 2003, not today’s.
Opinion 11-02 2011 A lawyer may participate in a for-profit group advertising program that lets only one lawyer advertise for each ZIP code, provided it fully and accurately discloses its advertising nature and that each lawyer has paid to be the sole lawyer listed for a ZIP code, and does nothing more to match clients than provide the name and contact information of participating lawyers, without any express or implied endorsement. ER 7.2’s prohibition is on paying for “recommendations”, not merely referrals; small changes in the facts could make the service a referral service, which ER 7.2(b)(2) would preclude absent approval by an appropriate regulatory authority. Pay-per-click charges based on the number of consumers who respond, and not on fees ultimately paid by clients who engage the lawyer, are a reasonable cost of advertisements under ER 7.2(b)(1), not fee sharing with nonlawyers. It applied the 2011 wordings, which lack the later former percentage-fee words, not the 2021 rules.
Opinion 13-01 2013 Reviewing no specific voucher: a lawyer’s participation in an internet marketing voucher or coupon program, in which the consumer pays the marketer, which keeps a share before remitting the rest, would likely violate one or more of several Ethical Rules, among them ERs 5.4 and 7.2, and practitioners are discouraged from using such a program. The consumer’s payment to the marketer for services not yet performed is a legal fee, so unless the program could avoid that characterization, which the Committee doubted, it would be an unethical sharing of legal fees with a non-lawyer even if the amount paid to the marketer were reasonable. It applied the pre-2021 ERs 5.4(a) and 7.2(b)(1).
Opinion 16-01 2016 A lawyer in a true “of counsel” relationship, one that is close, personal, continuous and regular, is a member of the same firm for ER 1.5(e), so ER 1.5(e) does not govern dividing fees with that lawyer. Where the lawyers are not in the same firm, whatever the title, fees may be split only if the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer receiving any portion of the fee assumes joint responsibility, the client agrees in a signed writing to the participation of all the lawyers involved and the division of the fees and responsibilities between the lawyers, and the total fee is reasonable. It applied the 2016 wording, which ended on January 1, 2021, not today’s ER 1.5(e).
Ethics Opinion EO-20-0003 Not dated Arizona Supreme Court Attorney Ethics Advisory Committee, on a bankruptcy practice whose lender advances 75% of the fees on each case and retains 25%: because the Supreme Court eliminated Former ER 5.4 effective January 1, 2021, the arrangement is no longer subject to Former ER 5.4, and, provided it does not run afoul of any other Rule of Professional Conduct, a nonlawyer lender may retain a percentage of a lawyer’s fee in exchange for services rendered; professional independence, confidentiality and conflict-free representation remain paramount. Passing the lender’s charge to the client requires disclosing its nature and details and the alternatives, the fee remaining reasonable; disclosing client information to the lender requires the client’s informed consent; the conflicts the arrangement raises may require informed consent, confirmed in writing; and in consumer bankruptcy the arrangement must be disclosed to the court. It did not address the alternative business structure rules (n.2), and it construes no ER 5.4 words in force.

What our research did not find

  • ER 7.2 reads “[Reserved]” from January 1, 2021 (Order R-20-0030), and ER 5.4 was abrogated effective January 1, 2021 (Order R-20-0034); our research holds no current version of ER 5.4. Former ER 7.2(b), (b)(1)–(3) and Comments [3] and [5]–[7], and former ER 5.4(a), (a)(1)–(4), (c) and Comment [1], ended on January 1, 2021, and no start date is held for them (no first-adoption instrument is held). This page states them only as former rules and gives no start date.
  • The same order adopted Rule 31.1(c), under which an alternative business structure that includes nonlawyers may employ lawyers to provide legal services only if, among other conditions, it is licensed under ACJA § 7-209, and Rule 33.1 on the committee that regulates those entities; the requirements of those rules are not in the research this page is drawn from. This page does not state what Arizona now requires for sharing fees with nonlawyers or paying for recommendations, beyond EO-20-0003 and the words quoted here, and does not say Arizona has no such rule.
  • Whether pre-2021 analysis under former ER 5.4 or former ER 7.2(b) carries over after the January 1, 2021 abrogation and reservation is not decided by any authority we hold. Only EO-20-0003 speaks after the change, and only to its fee-financing facts. This page does not present the pre-2021 opinions or decisions on ERs 5.4 or 7.2 as stating today’s law, and does not say they have been displaced.
  • Today’s ER 1.5(e) is in force from January 1, 2021, and no authority we hold applies it. Opinions 04-02, 05-02 and 10-04 applied the wording from December 1, 2003, Levine the 2015 wording of (e)(2), and Opinion 16-01 the 2016 wording (held in our research as a stored former version not used on this page; the 2003 and pre-2003 wordings are held only as the authorities quote them). This page does not present any of them as construing today’s ER 1.5(e), and does not present the proportion-or-joint-responsibility route, the “participation of all the lawyers involved” clause, or Opinion 04-02’s conclusion that the client need not agree to each lawyer’s share as today’s rule.
  • Former ER 7.2(b)(2), as stored, carries a percentage fee that “shall not exceed ten percent”, and former ER 5.4(a)(4), as stored, carries “or fees otherwise received and permissible under these rules”. Both appear in Opinion 13-01’s quotation (2013) but not in the rules Opinions 10-01 (2010) and 11-02 (2011) quote, and when they were added is not held. This page does not cite 10-01 or 11-02 as construing those words, and does not state ten percent as a current cap: it is a former rule’s figure that ended on January 1, 2021.
  • Opinions 02-08 and 05-08 applied earlier ER 7.3(a) wordings (pre-2003 and 2003), which prohibited in-person and telephone solicitation; today’s ER 7.3(a) is a definition, and the prohibition is ER 7.3(b). The pre-2021 ER 7.3(a) words “or employ or compensate another to do so”, struck by Order R-20-0030, are not in our research. This page does not read 02-08 or 05-08 against today’s ER 7.3(a). Today’s ER 7.3 Comment [4] still refers to “advertisements and communications permitted under ER 7.2” although ER 7.2 is reserved; this page draws nothing from it about what ER 7.2 permits today.
  • ER 8.5(b), (b)(1) and (b)(2) are held with no effective date (no instrument we hold names them), so this page gives none.
  • A.R.S. 12-3453(A) is held only as the 2025 session law (Laws 2025, ch. 226, § 1), dated January 1, 2026; the codified section on azleg.gov is not held, and A.R.S. 12-3451 and 12-3454 are not in our research. Its stored words keep the session law’s capitals (“Pay”, “SEPARATELY”) and read “without disclosing in writing to the potential borrower.” as one sentence. This page quotes only those words, states no penalty, definition or other subsection, and does not describe the section as part of, or a replacement for, ER 7.2: its words speak to a litigation financier.
  • Our searches (October 3–4, 2026) found no Arizona statute on dividing fees (ER 1.5(e)), sharing fees with nonlawyers (ER 5.4(a)), solicitation (ER 7.3) or choice of law (ER 8.5(b)) beyond Laws 2025, chapter 226 (A.R.S. 20-463 and 13-3713 were found and ruled out of scope); no Arizona court decision applying former ER 7.2(b), ER 7.3 or ER 8.5(b); and no ethics opinion applying ER 8.5(b). The Attorney Ethics Advisory Committee’s issued-opinions list was not captured; its opinions were found only through a search of azbar.org. This page states what these searches found, not that no such statute, decision or opinion exists.
  • Opinion 05-02 and EO-20-0003 carry no issue date in our research (05-02’s copyright line reads 2003 though it is numbered 05-02; EO-20-0003 names ER 5.4 as abrogated effective January 1, 2021), so this page does not date them. The other State Bar opinions are dated by their copyright year only.
  • The State Bar Committee opinions each state that they are advisory in nature only and not binding in any disciplinary or other legal proceedings; EO-20-0003 is an opinion of the Arizona Supreme Court’s Attorney Ethics Advisory Committee. This page does not present any of them as binding.
  • Some authorities rest on thin bases. Gottesman’s ER 5.4(a) statement is the Disciplinary Commission’s, in reciprocal discipline, without analysis; Phillips cites ER 5.4(a) in a footnote to a sanction term; Levine rests on ER 1.5(c) and ER 1.5(e)(2) together; and Opinion 05-02 recites ERs 1.5(e), 5.4 and 7.2 but decides under ER 8.4(a). This page rests no general statement on Gottesman, Phillips or 05-02 alone.
  • Some stored texts carry defects, which this page does not reproduce as rule text: OCR errors in Gottesman and Struthers; Opinion 10-04 prints (e)(2) without “all”; Opinion 11-02 calls the fee-sharing bar ER 5.3; Opinion 06-06 cites the referral-service exception as ER 7.2(b)(1); Opinion 05-02 prints “any thing of value”; Opinion 13-01 repeats passages. The stored former ER 5.4(a)(2) splits “disappeared” across a line, and the stored former ER 7.2(b)(2) carries a splice where Order R-20-0030’s redline inserted words; this page paraphrases both rather than quote them.
  • Not in our research for this page: the Comments to ER 1.5 (including the former Comment that Opinions 04-02 and 10-01 quote, and Comment [9], in force from January 1, 2023), and ERs 1.0 (including “firm”), 1.17, 5.3, 5.5, 7.1 and 8.4. Peterson v. Anderson (1987), which Struthers, Levine and Opinion 10-04 rely on, was decided under the former Code and is not carried. Opinions 01-09 and 02-01 link the pre-2003 ER 7.1(j) and (r)(3), which are not in our research. This page does not state the terms of any of them.
  • Cited leads not read: about 30 Arizona bar opinions (70-20 to 99-08, and ADV 01-93; among them 02-01, 85-8, 86-3, 87-24, 91-04, 94-04, 95-13 and 99-06, which the opinions here cite), Landi v. Arkules and In re Levine (2017). This page does not describe them, and the authorities on this page are not the only Arizona authorities on the topic.
  • The azbar.org pages (ERs 1.5, 7.3 and 8.5, and the State Bar opinions) were captured as browser-rendered pages; their currency rests on our verifiers’ browser re-reads of October 3–4, 2026. This page does not say the rule text was checked against the live site after those dates.
  • Later treatment of every Arizona authority on this page has not been searched. This page states what each authority held or advised, not that it remains good law.

Frequently asked questions

Can I share a referral fee with a lawyer in Arizona?

ER 1.5(e) of Arizona’s Rules of Professional Conduct, in force since January 1, 2021, lets two or more firms jointly working on a matter divide a fee paid by a client only if all four of its conditions are met. The firms disclose to the client in writing how the fee will be divided and how the firms will divide responsibility for the matter among themselves; the client consents to the division of fees in a writing signed by the client; the total fee is reasonable; and the division of responsibility among firms is reasonable in light of the client’s need that the entire representation be completely and diligently completed. No authority we hold applies today’s words.

Is there a cap on referral fees in Arizona?

ER 1.5(e), in force since January 1, 2021, states no percentage limit on either firm’s share. It requires that the total fee be reasonable and that the division of responsibility among firms be reasonable in light of the client’s need that the entire representation be completely and diligently completed.

Does the client have to agree to a fee division in writing in Arizona?

Yes. ER 1.5(e)(2) requires, for every division, that the client consent to the division of fees in a writing signed by the client, and ER 1.5(e)(1) requires that the firms disclose to the client in writing how the fee will be divided and how the firms will divide responsibility for the matter among themselves. No authority we hold applies these words, which have been in force since January 1, 2021.

Can an Arizona lawyer divide a fee with a lawyer from another state?

Applying the ER 1.5(e) wording in force from December 1, 2003, not today’s, State Bar of Arizona Opinion 10-04 (2010, advisory) advised that “lawyer” in ER 1.5(e) includes a lawyer admitted in another U.S. jurisdiction, so an Arizona lawyer may divide a fee with a referring out-of-state lawyer if the arrangement meets ER 1.5(e) and the out-of-state lawyer’s services comply with ER 5.5 and the pro hac vice rules, and that the client must also acknowledge that the out-of-state lawyer is not admitted in Arizona and consent to that lawyer’s representation. Which state’s rules apply in discipline is set by ER 8.5(b); no authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral or fee division.

Sources

  • Arizona Rules of Professional Conduct, as printed by the State Bar of Arizona, fetched October 3, 2026: ER 1.5, ER 7.3, ER 8.5
  • Arizona Supreme Court Order R-20-0030 (ER 7.2 reserved; former ER 7.2(b) and Comments), fetched October 3, 2026: azcourts.gov
  • Arizona Supreme Court Order R-20-0034 (ER 5.4 abrogated; former ER 5.4(a), (c) and Comment [1]), fetched October 3, 2026: azcourts.gov
  • Laws 2025, chapter 226, § 1 (A.R.S. 12-3453(A)), fetched October 3, 2026: azleg.gov
  • Cases and ethics opinions: linked in the tables above.

More states: Referral fee rules by state.

Disclaimer

This page summarizes a state’s rules on dividing fees between lawyers, from the primary sources it cites, as of the dates shown. It is general information for lawyers, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship with Rose Law Firm, PLLC dba LegalFlare. Rules and the way courts and bar authorities read them change. Read the cited sources, and check with the state bar or your own counsel, before relying on anything here.