Short answer. Oregon lets lawyers who are not in the same firm divide a fee only if the client gives informed consent to the fact that there will be a division of fees and the total fee of the lawyers and LPs for all legal services they rendered the client is not clearly excessive (Rule 1.5(d)). The rule asks for no writing, sets no proportion or joint-responsibility condition for a division between lawyers, and states no percentage limit on either lawyer’s share. A division between a lawyer and an LP must also be in proportion to the services performed by each (Rule 1.5(d)(3)).
Sources read October 9, 2026; checked against LegalFlare’s research October 28, 2026. Rules text is as printed in the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct published by the Oregon State Bar (as effective September 3, 2026), fetched October 9, 2026; Oregon’s former Rule 7.2(c)(1)–(4) are as printed in an Internet Archive copy of those Rules, fetched October 9, 2026. Statutes are as printed in the 2025 edition of ORS chapter 9, fetched October 9, 2026. This page is general information, not legal advice. See the disclaimer.
Oregon’s referral fee rules at a glance
| Question | Oregon’s answer | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Governing rule | Rule 1.5(d), Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct | Or. RPC 1.5(d), p. 5 |
| Written client consent | Not required by the rule’s words; the client gives informed consent to the fact that there will be a division of fees | Rule 1.5(d)(1) |
| Notice to the client | The client’s informed consent goes to the fact that there will be a division of fees; the rule’s words do not name each lawyer’s share or the terms of the division | Rule 1.5(d)(1) |
| Proportion to services or joint responsibility | Not required for a division between lawyers; a division between a lawyer and an LP must be in proportion to the services performed by each | Rule 1.5(d)(3) |
| Reasonable total fee | Required: the total fee of the lawyers and LPs for all legal services they rendered the client is not clearly excessive | Rule 1.5(d)(2) |
| Cap on the secondary lawyer’s share | None stated in Rule 1.5(d) | Rule 1.5(d) |
| Statutes | ORS 9.505 bars offering, promising, paying or accepting money or other consideration for referring to an attorney any claim for damage resulting from personal injury or death; ORS 9.515(2) says it does not prohibit referrals between licensees of the bar or dividing fees with another licensee consistent with the rules of professional conduct. ORS 9.500, 9.510 and 9.520, on soliciting business on account of personal injuries and on claims obtained from a solicitor, are quoted under Paying for referrals, and nonlawyers, below | ORS 9.500, 9.505, 9.510, 9.515, 9.520 |
What Rule 1.5(d) says
Rule 1.5(d) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct governs the division of a fee between lawyers, or lawyers and LPs, who are not in the same firm. Its words, in force since January 1, 2026 (Or. RPC 1.5(d), p. 5):
(d) A division of a fee between lawyers, or lawyers and LPs, who are not in the same firm may be made only if:
(1) the client gives informed consent to the fact that there will be a division of fees;
(2) the total fee of the lawyers and LPs for all legal services they rendered the client is not clearly excessive; and
(3) if the division of a fee is between a lawyer and an LP, the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer and LP.
These words added LPs and paragraph (d)(3). From January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2025, Rule 1.5(d) covered divisions between lawyers only, with paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2). The January 1, 2026 date rests on the rulebook’s history notes; the Supreme Court order making the amendment is not held in our research.
Oregon State Bar Formal Ethics Opinion 2026-209 (September 2026) describes a fee split under Rule 1.5(d) as occurring when the client receives a single billing and the fee is paid to two or more lawyers not in the same firm; firms separately billing for distinct services is not a fee split (n.5).
What the client must agree to in writing
Oregon’s rule asks for no writing. A division may be made only if the client gives informed consent to the fact that there will be a division of fees (Rule 1.5(d)(1)), the total fee of the lawyers and LPs for all legal services they rendered the client is not clearly excessive (Rule 1.5(d)(2)), and, if the division is between a lawyer and an LP, the division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer and LP (Rule 1.5(d)(3)). The rule’s words require the client’s informed consent; they do not require that the consent be in writing or that the client agree to each lawyer’s share.
What must be disclosed to the client
The client’s informed consent goes to the fact that there will be a division of fees (Rule 1.5(d)(1)). The rule’s words do not name each lawyer’s share or the terms of the division.
Oregon RPC 1.0(g), as quoted in Oregon State Bar Formal Ethics Opinion 2005-133, defines informed consent as the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct. Rule 1.0 itself is not among the rules quoted on this page. From January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2025, Rule 1.5(d)(1) carried the same consent term for divisions between lawyers.
Proportionality or joint responsibility
For a division between lawyers, Rule 1.5(d) sets no proportion or joint-responsibility condition. Besides the client’s informed consent (Rule 1.5(d)(1)), it requires that the total fee of the lawyers and LPs for all legal services they rendered the client is not clearly excessive (Rule 1.5(d)(2)). Proportion is required only when the division is between a lawyer and an LP: it must then be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer and LP (Rule 1.5(d)(3)).
Oregon’s former Code of Professional Responsibility once required more. Its DR 2-107(A), which our research records as superseded by Rule 1.5(d), required a division in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed until that requirement was eliminated effective June 1, 1986 (Potts, Trammell and Hannon, n.4). The Oregon Supreme Court found a split that failed it in Potts, Trammell and Hannon (1986), and the Court of Appeals held in Fitzgibbon v. Carey (1984) that it did not displace an equal joint-venture split where each lawyer performed substantial services. Under the post-1986 DR 2-107, Frost v. Lotspeich (2001) held that nothing in it conditions the enforceability of a fee-division agreement on the division between the lawyers being reasonable by DR 2-106(B)’s factors. These decisions applied the former Code’s words, not Rule 1.5(d), and the former proportion requirement is not in Rule 1.5(d).
Referring a case out of Oregon, or into it
Oregon’s choice-of-law rule, Rule 8.5(b), says which jurisdiction’s rules of professional conduct apply when Oregon exercises its disciplinary authority (Or. RPC 8.5(b), p. 31), in force since January 1, 2005:
(b) Choice of Law. In any exercise of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction, the Rules of Professional Conduct to be applied shall be as follows:
(1) for conduct in connection with a matter pending before a tribunal, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the tribunal sits, unless the rules of the tribunal provide otherwise; and
(2) for any other conduct, the rules of the jurisdiction in which the lawyer’s conduct occurred, or, if the predominant effect of the conduct is in a different jurisdiction, the rules of that jurisdiction shall be applied to the conduct. A lawyer shall not be subject to discipline if the lawyer’s conduct conforms to the rules of a jurisdiction in which the lawyer reasonably believes the predominant effect of the lawyer’s conduct will occur.
Choice of law in a fee-division agreement. In Frost v. Lotspeich (2001), decided before Rule 8.5 took effect, the Oregon Court of Appeals applied choice-of-law principles to a fee-division agreement between an Oregon lawyer and a California lawyer: it held that California rule 2-200(A) requires the client’s written consent to the division, and that a California lawyer’s violation of it, if proved, would bar enforcing the agreement in Oregon.
Fee splits with out-of-state firms that have nonlawyer owners. Oregon State Bar Formal Ethics Opinion 2026-209 (September 2026) says an Oregon lawyer may not split a fee with an out-of-state alternative business structure that has one or more nonlawyer owners and offers legal services in Oregon, on a matter involving an Oregon client, Oregon law, an Oregon tribunal, services performed in Oregon or conduct whose predominant effect is in Oregon. Citing Rule 8.5(b), it does not address a client resident in, or a matter arising under the law of, a jurisdiction that permits nonlawyer ownership (n.1). It decides nothing under Rule 8.5(b).
No Oregon court decision or ethics opinion applying Rule 8.5(b) was found (searched October 9, 2026), and the case-law search ran no query naming Rule 8.5. No Oregon statute on choice of law for lawyer discipline was found. No authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral under Rule 8.5(b).
Paying for referrals, and nonlawyers
- Payment for referrals. A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending the lawyer’s services (Rule 7.2(b)), except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable costs of advertisements or communications permitted by Rule 7.2 (Rule 7.2(b)(1)); pay the usual charges of a legal service plan or a lawyer referral service (Rule 7.2(b)(2)); pay for a law practice in accordance with Rule 1.17 (Rule 7.2(b)(3)); and give nominal gifts as an expression of appreciation that are neither intended nor reasonably expected to be a form of compensation for recommending a lawyer’s services (Rule 7.2(b)(4)). Oregon’s Rule 7.2(b) has no exception for reciprocal referral agreements.
Advertising, and naming a responsible lawyer. Today’s Rule 7.2(a) and 7.2(c) read (Or. RPC 7.2, p. 28):
(a) Subject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may advertise services through written, recorded or electronic communication, including public media.
(c) Any communication made pursuant to this rule shall include the name and contact information of at least one lawyer or law firm responsible for its content.
Rule 7.2(a) has read this way since January 1, 2014. Rule 7.2(c) has read this way since January 1, 2017, a date that rests on the printed Rules’ history note; the 2017 order is not part of our research. No authority on this page is linked to Rule 7.2(a) or 7.2(c), and this page attributes no ruling under either rule to any opinion.
Oregon’s former Rule 7.2(c)(1)–(4). From January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2013, Oregon’s Rule 7.2(a) and 7.2(c) held other words: a ban on paying anyone to recommend a lawyer, with its exceptions, and the conditions on legal service plans and lawyer referral services. Of those, paragraphs (c)(1)–(4) read as follows (Internet Archive copy of Or. RPC, p. 32). These words are Oregon’s former rule, not the law today, and today’s Rule 7.2(c) has no sub-parts:
(1) the operation of such plan, service or organization does not result in the lawyer or the lawyer’s firm violating Rule 5.4, Rule 5.5, ORS 9.160, or ORS 9.500 through 9.520;
(2) the recipient of legal services, and not the plan, service or organization, is recognized as the client;
(3) no condition or restriction on the exercise of any participating lawyer’s professional judgment on behalf of a client is imposed by the plan, service or organization; and
(4) such plan, service or organization does not make communications that would violate Rule 7.3 if engaged in by the lawyer. - Nonlawyers. A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer (Rule 5.4(a)), except that: an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer’s firm or firm members may provide for the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer’s death, to the lawyer’s estate or to one or more specified persons (Rule 5.4(a)(1)); a lawyer who purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or disappeared lawyer may, pursuant to Rule 1.17, pay the agreed-upon purchase price to that lawyer’s estate or other representative (Rule 5.4(a)(2)); a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even one based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement (Rule 5.4(a)(3)); a lawyer may share legal fees awarded by a tribunal with a nonprofit organization that employed, retained or recommended employment of the lawyer in the matter (Rule 5.4(a)(4)); and a lawyer may pay the usual charges of a bar-operated not-for-profit lawyer referral service, including fees calculated as a percentage of legal fees received by the lawyer from a referral (Rule 5.4(a)(5)).
Under the former Code’s DR 3-102(A), In re Griffith (1987) held that DR 3-102(A) prohibits a lawyer from giving a non-lawyer a share of a legal fee in exchange for services related to the obtaining or performance of legal work (see Oregon cases, below). It applied DR 3-102(A) to conduct in 1980-1982. Our research holds no words for the lead-in of DR 3-102(A) that Griffith construed, and no tie in our research makes Rule 5.4(a)’s lead-in its successor, so this page does not present Griffith as construing Rule 5.4(a). - Solicitation. Rule 7.3 of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct (Solicitation of Clients) reads (Or. RPC 7.3, p. 28):
A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by any means when:
(a) the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the physical, emotional or mental state of the subject of the solicitation is such that the person could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer;
(b) the person who is the subject of the solicitation has made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the lawyer; or
(c) the solicitation involves coercion, duress or harassment.
These words carry no effective date in our research, and this page gives no date for them. The Comparison to Oregon Code printed with Rule 7.3 (a note in the printed Rules, not the Rule’s words) reads: “This rule incorporates elements of DR 2-101(D) and (H) and DR 2-104.” Opinions 2005-2, 2005-112, 2005-175 and 2021-196 apply or cite Rule 7.3 on soliciting clients (see the ethics opinions, below); none of them applies Rule 7.3 to a division of fees between lawyers.
By statute, ORS 9.500 reads (ORS 9.500, 9.510):
No person shall solicit within the state any business on account of a claim for personal injuries to any person, or solicit any litigation on account of personal injuries to any person within the state, and any contract wherein any person not an attorney agrees to recover, either through litigation or otherwise, any damages for personal injuries to any person shall be void.
ORS 9.510 reads:
No attorney shall solicit business at factories, mills, hospitals or other places, or retain members of a firm or runners or solicitors for the purpose of obtaining business on account of personal injuries to any person, or for the purpose of bringing damage suits on account of personal injuries.
These are quoted from the 2025 edition of ORS chapter 9; their effective dates are not held in our research, and this page gives no date for them. Oregon’s own authorities differ on whom ORS 9.500 reaches: In re Lee (1965) applied it to a lawyer’s letter, and In re Farris (1961) read ORS 9.500 and 9.510 together as making it unlawful for an attorney to solicit personal injury claims, while In re O’Neal (1984, n.1) said ORS 9.500 refers to solicitation by a nonlawyer. Each holding is that court’s; the question is open in Oregon’s own authorities, and this page does not settle it. In re Black (1961) and In re Ruben (1961) applied ORS 9.510 to lawyers’ solicitation (see Oregon cases, below). - Statutes. ORS 9.505: “No person shall offer or promise payment of money or other consideration, or accept any offer or promise of payment of money or other consideration, nor shall any person pay or accept money or other consideration, for referring to an attorney any claim for damage resulting from personal injury or death.” ORS 9.515 qualifies it: “(1) Nothing contained in ORS 9.505 shall prevent referral of claims, suits or actions between licensees of the bar.” and “(2) The provisions of ORS 9.505 shall not prohibit the referral of claims, suits or actions between licensees of the bar or the dividing of fees for legal services with another licensee consistent with the rules of professional conduct adopted pursuant to ORS 9.490.” ORS 9.520: “No attorney shall accept from a solicitor described in ORS 9.500 any claim for damages, or bring an action for damages on account of any claim obtained from such solicitor. Any agreement between an attorney and such solicitor regarding compensation to be paid to the attorney or solicitor is void.” These are quoted from the 2025 edition of ORS chapter 9; their effective dates are not held in our research. Whom ORS 9.500 reaches is an open question in Oregon’s own authorities; ORS 9.500 and 9.510 are set out under Solicitation, above.
Oregon cases
These decisions applied Oregon’s former Code of Professional Responsibility or ORS chapter 9, not today’s Rule 1.5(d), Rule 5.4(a) or Rule 7.2(b). We state what each decision held, in the words of our research. Whether their readings of client consent and the total fee carry over to Rule 1.5(d)(1)–(2) is an open question in our research. Later treatment of these decisions has not been searched, so do not read this list as a statement that each one remains good law.
| Case | Citation | Year | What it held |
|---|---|---|---|
| In re Black | 228 Or. 9; 363 P.2d 206 | 1961 | Oregon Supreme Court, disbarring a lawyer charged mostly with soliciting damage cases through paid runners: the evidence supported the trial committee’s findings, and it established that the lawyer violated ORS 9.510, which, in the Court’s words, prohibits an attorney from soliciting business in hospitals and other places and prohibits the retention of runners to solicit business for him. It does not quote ORS 9.510’s words, and the statute carries no date in our research. |
| In re Ruben | 228 Or. 5; 363 P.2d 773 | 1961 | Oregon Supreme Court: a lawyer who appeared at hospitals, once obtaining a signed contingent fee contract from a participant in an accident and once offering his services to a person injured in an automobile accident, engaged in direct solicitation that violated the canons of ethics and ORS 9.510; the charge that he employed runners was not proved. Two-year suspension. Its note quotes ORS 9.510 in the words our research holds. |
| In re Farris | 229 Or. 209; 367 P.2d 387 | 1961 | Oregon Supreme Court, in a disbarment proceeding, held that a charge that the accused violated ORS 9.520 need not be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, because a disbarment proceeding is civil, not criminal; the evidence must be clear and convincing. The Court also held ORS 9.500 and 9.510 not vague: in plain language they make it unlawful for an attorney to solicit personal injury claims either directly or through an agent. It found that the record showed the accused received personal injury claims through an insurance adjuster’s paid solicitation, and ordered permanent disbarment on that and other charges. It does not quote the words of ORS 9.500, 9.510 or 9.520, and the statutes carry no date in our research. |
| In re Lee | 242 Or. 302; 409 P.2d 337 | 1965 | Oregon Supreme Court: a lawyer’s special-delivery letter to a couple he read had been in a traffic accident, offering “friendly legal advice”, violated ORS 9.500, although it did not request employment: unethical solicitation can be accomplished without words of request and entreaty. Public reprimand, with a false-notarization charge. It does not quote ORS 9.500’s words, and the statute carries no date in our research. O’Neal (1984, n.1) later read ORS 9.500 as referring to solicitation by a nonlawyer. |
| In re O’Neal | 297 Or. 258; 683 P.2d 1352 | 1984 | Oregon Supreme Court, under the former Code’s DR 2-103(A) as it then read (“A lawyer shall not compensate or give anything of value to a person or organization to recommend or secure his employment by a client …”), held that compensating or giving something of value is an element of the offense, and rejected the Disciplinary Review Board’s finding of a DR 2-103(A) violation, the Board’s own findings not establishing that the accused gave anything of value. It found the evidence not clear and convincing that the accused violated ORS 9.510 (which it quotes in the words our research holds), and in a note said that ORS 9.500 refers to solicitation by a nonlawyer and has no application to a lawyer’s case (n.1). It reprimanded the lawyer for a conflict of interest (DR 5-105) only. It applied the earlier wording of DR 2-103(A), older than the DR 2-103(A) text our research holds; our research records DR 2-103 as superseded by Rule 7.2(b), and DR 2-103(A) as superseded by Rule 7.2(a) as worded from 2005 to 2013. |
| Fitzgibbon v. Carey | 70 Or. App. 127; 688 P.2d 1367 | 1984 | Oregon Court of Appeals, in an accounting between lawyers who associated on a class action that produced $869,000 in fees, held that DR 2-107, as then worded (a division “in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each”), is aimed at forwarding-fee agreements and does not displace the joint-venture rule of equal division where each lawyer assumed active responsibility and performed substantial services and the total fee is not shown to be excessive; it affirmed the equal split. That proportion requirement was eliminated effective June 1, 1986 and is not in Rule 1.5(d). |
| In re Potts, Trammell and Hannon | 301 Or. 57; 718 P.2d 1363 | 1986 | Oregon Supreme Court, disciplining three lawyers over a $19,000 probate fee under DR 2-107(A) as then worded (client consent after full disclosure; a division in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed by each; a total fee not clearly exceeding reasonable compensation), held that the division, with $9,000 for a lawyer who assumed little responsibility, was not in proportion to the services performed and responsibility assumed, and that the total fee was excessive, so Potts and Trammell violated DR 2-107(A); Hannon, who took no part in the split agreement, did not. All three were reprimanded, each also for a clearly excessive fee (DR 2-106(A)). Its note 4 records that the proportion requirement was eliminated effective June 1, 1986. |
| In re Griffith | 304 Or. 575; 748 P.2d 86 | 1987 | Oregon Supreme Court, under the former Code’s DR 3-102(A) (“A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a non lawyer, except …”, as the opinion quotes it): DR 3-102(A) prohibits a lawyer from giving a non-lawyer a share of a legal fee in exchange for services related to the obtaining or performance of legal work. A lender with nonlawyer shareholders that only collected and kept a fee owed to the lawyer’s firm, and did nothing to generate or perform the legal services, was not given a share of it, so the lawyer was not guilty on that cause; he was disbarred on other causes. It applied DR 3-102(A) to conduct in 1980-1982. Our research holds no words for DR 3-102(A)’s lead-in, which Griffith construed, and holds (A)(1) and (A)(3) only as printed in 2003; no tie in our research makes Rule 5.4(a)’s lead-in the successor of that lead-in. |
| Frost v. Lotspeich | 175 Or App 163; 30 P3d 1185 | 2001 | Oregon Court of Appeals, on a dispute between an Oregon lawyer and a California lawyer over a 1994 fee-division letter, vacated the judgment and remanded. For guidance on remand it held that DR 2-107, not DR 2-106, governs fee-division agreements between lawyers, and that nothing in DR 2-107 (as worded after 1986: client consent after full disclosure; total fee not clearly exceeding reasonable compensation) conditions a fee-division agreement’s enforceability on the division between the lawyers being reasonable by DR 2-106(B)’s factors. It also held that California rule 2-200(A) requires the client’s written consent to the division, and that, under choice-of-law principles, a violation of it, if proved, would bar enforcing the agreement. It applied the former Code wording that Rule 1.5(d) superseded. |
Oregon State Bar ethics opinions
As with the cases, later treatment of these opinions has not been searched. Opinions 2005-2, 2005-25, 2005-73, 2005-101, 2005-112, 2005-133 and 2005-175 carry no issue date in our research; each is dated here by the Board of Governors’ approval of its revision. Opinions 2005-20, 2005-24 and 2005-69 (August 2005) predate Rule 5.4(a)(4) and (a)(5).
| Opinion | Date | What it said |
|---|---|---|
| Formal Opinion 2005-2 | As revised, February 2021 | A lawyer’s proposed agreement to send clients to a trust company in exchange for the company’s recommending the lawyer to its customers and employing the lawyer is a quid pro quo that would clearly violate Rules 7.2(b), 5.4(e) and 7.3, read with Rule 8.4(a)(1) (a lawyer cannot do indirectly what the lawyer cannot do directly); mere office sharing with a CPA, with no cross-referrals, would not. |
| Formal Opinion 2005-20 | August 2005 | A lawyer may use a collection agency to collect the lawyer’s own debts or debts owed to the lawyer’s clients, but in the latter case must take care not to share legal fees with a nonlawyer within the meaning of Rule 5.4(a). |
| Formal Opinion 2005-24 | August 2005 | A lawyer may employ suspended or disbarred lawyers in work that nonlawyers may lawfully do, but under Rule 5.4(a) they may not receive a share or percentage of legal fees earned by the lawyer on any specific case; other forms of compensation are not precluded. It was approved before Rule 5.4(a)(4) and (a)(5) took effect in 2022 and treats Rule 5.4(a)’s exceptions as not material. |
| Formal Opinion 2005-25 | As revised, April 2026 | Taking up fee sharing between a successor lawyer and a suspended or disbarred lawyer under Rules 1.5(d) and 5.4(a): during the suspension or disbarment that lawyer is a nonlawyer within Rule 5.4(a), so the successor may not share any fee for the successor’s own work with that lawyer, but may forward the portion of any fee to which that lawyer was entitled for work performed before the suspension or disbarment. |
| Formal Opinion 2005-69 | August 2005 | Where a court’s attorney-fee award exceeds the fee due under the lawyer’s contract with the client, the excess belongs to the client, and paying it to the client does not violate Rule 5.4’s prohibition on sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer. |
| Formal Opinion 2005-73 | As revised, February 2021 | A lawyer may accept referrals for which the lawyer has paid nothing, and under Rule 7.2(b)(4) may send the referring persons a small gift as an expression of appreciation, so long as the gift is not a payment in exchange for recommending the lawyer’s services; when the intent is not compensation for the referral, Rule 7.2(b) is not violated. It notes that many other states prohibit any gift for a referral. |
| Formal Opinion 2005-101 | As revised, November 2022 | A lawyer and a psychologist may form a mediation service; if the service would involve the practice of law, Rule 5.4(a) prohibits the lawyer from sharing fees with the psychologist, though the lawyer could hire the psychologist on a salary basis; if it would not, there is no ethical restriction on the allocation of profits or fees. |
| Formal Opinion 2005-112 | As revised, February 2021 | A health club that recommends a law firm to its members, in return for the firm’s free consultations and discounts, receives something of value from the firm under Rule 7.2(b); the firm may take part only if the value bestowed on the club does not exceed the reasonable cost of the advertising, and then Rule 7.2 is not violated. A paid profile in a welcoming program that only publicizes the firm, rather than recommending it, is permitted, and because the welcoming program is not operated to procure legal work, Rule 7.3 does not apply to it. |
| Formal Opinion 2005-133 | As revised, April 2026 | A lawyer may take part, with qualifications, in a nonlawyer company’s plan to finance clients’ legal fees. The company’s 10 percent service charge, deducted from the fees it pays the lawyer, is not an impermissible division of legal fees with a nonlawyer: Rule 5.4(a)’s purpose is to protect the lawyer’s professional independence of judgment, and it does not prohibit using a nonlawyer to collect legal fees even when the nonlawyer is paid from the collected fees. Its qualifications rest on Rules 1.7 and 1.6. |
| Formal Opinion 2005-175 | As revised, February 2021 | A lawyer may not join a business networking association whose members must make referrals to each other. Referring the lawyer’s clients to members in exchange for their promoting, recommending or securing the lawyer’s employment gives something of value in violation of Rule 7.2(b), and receiving referrals in exchange for referring clients to nonlawyer members violates Rule 5.4(e). The association is not a legal service plan or lawyer referral service whose usual charges Rule 7.2(b)(2) lets a lawyer pay, because its referrals are not limited to referrals to lawyers (n.1). It adds that, even in a group that does not require reciprocal referrals, lawyers must be careful that their follow-up on any referrals received is consistent with Rule 7.1 and the solicitation rules in Rule 7.3. |
| Formal Opinion 2021-196 | February 2021 | Under Rule 7.3: a lawyer may mail a flyer offering the lawyer’s services to every owner in a condominium building, so long as its statements are truthful and not misleading, and may call an owner to solicit the lawyer’s services if the call does not involve coercion, duress or harassment (Rule 7.3(c)), nothing indicates that the owner could not exercise reasonable judgment in employing a lawyer (Rule 7.3(a)), and the solicitation is not for the purpose of obtaining business on account of personal injuries to any person, or for the purpose of bringing damage suits on account of personal injuries (ORS 9.510). After the owner told the lawyer “don’t bother me again!”, the lawyer’s email that day asking the owner to reconsider violated Rule 7.3(b). It does not address paying anyone for a referral. |
| Formal Opinion 2026-209 | September 2026 | An Oregon lawyer may not split a fee with an out-of-state alternative business structure that has one or more nonlawyer owners and offers legal services in Oregon, on a matter involving an Oregon client, Oregon law, an Oregon tribunal, services performed in Oregon or conduct whose predominant effect is in Oregon. A fee split under Rule 1.5(d) occurs when the client receives a single billing and the fee is paid to two or more lawyers not in the same firm; firms separately billing for distinct services is not a fee split (n.5). Rule 5.4(a) bars sharing legal fees with a nonlawyer except as its subsections provide, and the only exception that contemplates an entity with nonlawyer ownership is Rule 5.4(a)(4), for fees awarded by a tribunal shared with a nonprofit (n.7). Citing Rule 8.5(b), it does not address a client resident in, or a matter arising under the law of, a jurisdiction that permits nonlawyer ownership (n.1). |
What our research did not find
- ORS 9.500, 9.505, 9.510, 9.515(1)–(2) and 9.520 are quoted from the 2025 edition of ORS chapter 9 (oregonlegislature.gov) with no effective date held, and no enrolled act is held, so this page gives no date for them. No authority we hold construes ORS 9.505. In re Farris (1961), In re Black (1961) and In re Lee (1965) applied ORS 9.500, 9.510 or 9.520 without quoting the statute they applied, so whether they applied today’s words is not established. In re Ruben (1961) and In re O’Neal (1984) quote ORS 9.510 in the words quoted on this page.
- ORS 9.990(2)–(3) is held in our research but is not part of what this page relies on, and this page does not describe it. The heading line of ORS 9.515 holds no stored words (its subsections (1) and (2) are quoted). No authority we hold reads ORS 9.515 together with Rule 1.5(d); this page states what ORS 9.515 says, not how a court has applied it. Oregon’s own authorities differ on whom ORS 9.500 reaches: In re Lee (1965) applied it to a lawyer’s letter, and In re Farris (1961) read ORS 9.500 and 9.510 together as making it unlawful for an attorney to solicit personal injury claims, while In re O’Neal (1984, n.1) said ORS 9.500 refers to solicitation by a nonlawyer. That is an open question in Oregon’s own authorities; this page states each holding as that court’s and does not say the question is settled either way.
- Our search of ORS chapter 9 (read October 9, 2026) recorded no Oregon statute found on dividing fees between lawyers, on sharing legal fees with nonlawyers, or on choice of law for lawyer discipline. ORS 9.515(2) does speak of dividing fees with another licensee, as an exception to ORS 9.505; it sets no conditions of its own beyond consistency with the rules of professional conduct. That no statute on sharing fees with nonlawyers or on choice of law was found does not mean none exists.
- No Oregon court decision or ethics opinion applying Rule 8.5(b) was found (searched October 9, 2026). The case-law search ran no query naming Rule 8.5.
- Rule 7.2(b)(2) and (b)(3) carry no effective date: our research holds two undated versions of each and uses the words of the current printed Rules, so this page gives no date for them. The Supreme Court orders amending Rule 7.2 (January 1, 2017 and January 13, 2020) and Rule 1.5 (January 1, 2026) are not held; those dates rest on the rulebook’s history notes. The former Code provisions named here (DR 2-103, 2-107 and 3-102) carry no start date.
- Rule 1.5(d) took its current words on January 1, 2026, adding LPs and paragraph (d)(3); from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2025 it covered lawyers only, with paragraphs (d)(1)–(2). The Oregon LP Rules of Professional Conduct, which Rule 1.5(e) names, were not loaded in our research, and this page does not state what they require.
- Rule 7.2(a) and 7.2(c) are quoted in today’s words from the current printed Rules: Rule 7.2(a) from January 1, 2014, dated by Oregon Supreme Court order CJO 13-071, which prints its words; Rule 7.2(c) from January 1, 2017, dated by the rulebook’s history note (the 2017 order is not held). From January 1, 2014 to December 31, 2016, Rule 7.2(c) required the name and office address of at least one lawyer or law firm; those words are not in our research, so this page does not quote them. From January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2013, Rule 7.2(a) and 7.2(c) held other words: a ban on paying anyone to recommend a lawyer, with its exceptions, and the conditions on legal service plans and lawyer referral services. Of those, our research holds only Rule 7.2(c)(1)–(4), and this page states them only as Oregon’s former rule, never as in force; today’s Rule 7.2(c) has no sub-parts. The former Code’s DR 2-103(A) and DR 2-103(C)–(C)(4) are recorded as superseded by Rule 7.2(a) and 7.2(c) as worded from 2005 to 2013, not by today’s Rule 7.2(a) (an advertising permission) or today’s Rule 7.2(c) (naming a responsible lawyer or firm), and this page does not say today’s Rule 7.2(a) or 7.2(c) replaced them. No authority on this page is linked to Rule 7.2(a) or 7.2(c). Opinion 2005-112 quotes today’s Rule 7.2(a) and Opinion 2021-196 quotes today’s Rule 7.2(c), but neither is linked to those rules in our research and their holdings here state no ruling under them, so this page attributes no Rule 7.2(a) or 7.2(c) holding to them. Rule 7.2 itself holds no words of its own in our research.
- The Comparison to Oregon Code printed after Rule 7.2 is an Oregon State Bar annotation, undated and not adopted by the Court. It describes Rule 7.2 as worded from 2014 to 2016, before the January 1, 2017 amendment (rulebook history note), not today’s Rule 7.2(b)(2) or 7.2(c). This page does not quote, paraphrase or rely on the note for what Rule 7.2 requires today.
- Rule 7.3, 7.3(a)–(c) and the Comparison to Oregon Code printed with Rule 7.3 are quoted from the current printed Rules with no effective date held, so this page gives no date for them. Opinions 2005-2, 2005-112, 2005-175 and 2021-196 apply or cite Rule 7.3 on soliciting clients; none of them applies Rule 7.3 to a division of fees between lawyers.
- Fitzgibbon v. Carey (1984) and Potts, Trammell and Hannon (1986) applied DR 2-107(A) as worded before June 1, 1986, with a proportion requirement Rule 1.5(d) does not carry; Frost v. Lotspeich (2001) applied the post-1986 DR 2-107(A); In re O’Neal (1984) applied DR 2-103(A) as worded in 1984. In re Griffith (1987) applied DR 3-102(A)’s lead-in as worded in 1980-1982; our research holds no words for that lead-in, and no tie in our research makes Rule 5.4(a)’s lead-in its successor. Their holdings are stated as their own. Whether their consent and total-fee readings carry over to Rule 1.5(d)(1)–(2) is an open question in our research. This page does not present them as construing Rule 1.5(d), Rule 5.4(a) or Rule 7.2(b), or present a proportion test as Oregon law for divisions between lawyers.
- Opinions 2005-2, 2005-25, 2005-73, 2005-101, 2005-112, 2005-133 and 2005-175 carry no issue date in our research; each prints only the Board’s approval of its revision (2021, 2022 or 2026), and this page dates them only by that revision. Opinions 2005-20, 2005-24 and 2005-69 (August 2005) predate Rule 5.4(a)(4) and (a)(5).
- Two opinions misquote a Rule 5.4(a) exception: Opinion 2005-101 prints (a)(5) ending “from the referral” where the rule reads “from a referral”, and Opinion 2026-209 n.7 quotes (a)(4) as “share fees awarded” where the rule reads “share legal fees awarded”. This page gives the rule’s words, not the opinions’.
- Rule 5.4(e), which Opinions 2005-2 and 2005-175 apply, and Rule 1.5(e) are held in our research but are not part of what this page relies on, and this page does not state their terms.
- The Oregon State Bar’s Lawyer Referral Service rules (Bylaw 15.6, Policy 15.600, and the remittance terms of the Lawyer Referral Service’s policies and procedures) are held as bar rules but are not part of what this page relies on; they are Board policy, not Supreme Court rules. This page does not state the remittance terms.
- Held in our research but not described here: Opinions 2005-115 and 2005-168, which the rules this page relies on do not reach.
- Leads not read or not loaded: Opinions 2005-35, 2005-79 and 2005-108 (cited by opinions we hold); CourtListener search hits not captured; Blaylock (1999), Little and King (1967) and OSB Op. 1991-35, deferred as decided under superseded rules; Opinions 2005-100, 2005-127 and 2007-180, withdrawn in 2018 and held only as stubs; and Order No. 12-081 (2012). The authorities on this page are not the only Oregon authority on the topic.
- Later treatment of every Oregon authority on this page has not been searched. This page states what each authority held, not that it remains good law.
Frequently asked questions
Can I share a referral fee with a lawyer in Oregon?
Rule 1.5(d) of the Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct allows a division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm only if the client gives informed consent to the fact that there will be a division of fees and the total fee of the lawyers and LPs for all legal services they rendered the client is not clearly excessive. For a division between lawyers, the rule sets no proportion or joint-responsibility condition. By statute, no person shall offer or promise payment of money or other consideration, or accept any offer or promise of such payment, nor shall any person pay or accept money or other consideration, for referring to an attorney any claim for damage resulting from personal injury or death (ORS 9.505), but ORS 9.515(2) says it does not prohibit the referral of claims, suits or actions between licensees of the bar or the dividing of fees for legal services with another licensee consistent with the rules of professional conduct.
Is there a cap on referral fees in Oregon?
Rule 1.5(d) states no percentage limit on either lawyer’s share. It requires that the total fee of the lawyers and LPs for all legal services they rendered the client not be clearly excessive. For a division between lawyers it sets no proportion condition; a division between a lawyer and an LP must be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer and LP (Rule 1.5(d)(3)).
Does the client have to agree to a fee division in writing in Oregon?
Not by the rule’s words. Rule 1.5(d)(1) requires that the client give informed consent to the fact that there will be a division of fees. It does not require that the consent be in writing or that the client agree to each lawyer’s share.
Can an Oregon lawyer divide a fee with a lawyer from another state?
Rule 1.5(d) governs a division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the same firm. In Frost v. Lotspeich (2001), decided under Oregon’s former Code before Rule 8.5 took effect, the Oregon Court of Appeals held, on a fee-division agreement between an Oregon lawyer and a California lawyer, that California rule 2-200(A) requires the client’s written consent to the division and that, under choice-of-law principles, a California lawyer’s violation of it, if proved, would bar enforcing the agreement in Oregon. Oregon State Bar Formal Ethics Opinion 2026-209 says an Oregon lawyer may not split a fee with an out-of-state alternative business structure that has one or more nonlawyer owners and offers legal services in Oregon, on a matter involving an Oregon client, Oregon law, an Oregon tribunal, services performed in Oregon or conduct whose predominant effect is in Oregon. Citing Rule 8.5(b), it does not address a client resident in, or a matter arising under the law of, a jurisdiction that permits nonlawyer ownership (n.1). No authority we hold decides which state’s rules govern a cross-border referral under Rule 8.5(b).
Sources
- Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct (Rules 1.5, 5.4, 7.2, 7.3, 8.5), Oregon State Bar, as effective September 3, 2026, fetched October 9, 2026: osbar.org
- Former Oregon Rules of Professional Conduct (Rule 7.2(c)(1)–(4), in force from January 1, 2005 to December 31, 2013), Internet Archive copy of the Oregon State Bar’s printed Rules, fetched October 9, 2026: web.archive.org
- Oregon Revised Statutes chapter 9 (ORS 9.500, 9.505, 9.510, 9.515, 9.520), 2025 edition, fetched October 9, 2026: oregonlegislature.gov
- Former Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility (DR 2-103, 2-107, 3-102), as approved through June 17, 2003, fetched October 9, 2026: osbar.org
- Cases and ethics opinions: linked in the tables above.
More states: Referral fee rules by state.
Disclaimer
This page summarizes a state’s rules on dividing fees between lawyers, from the primary sources it cites, as of the dates shown. It is general information for lawyers, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney-client relationship with Rose Law Firm, PLLC dba LegalFlare. Rules and the way courts and bar authorities read them change. Read the cited sources, and check with the state bar or your own counsel, before relying on anything here.